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Abstract: Direct union elections, a new institutional arrangement in grassroots trade 
unions in China, have been introduced experimentally in coastal regions since 
2000. Using matched employer–employee data, this study examines the effects of direct 
union elections on workers’ economic wellbeing. Results reveal that 1) union members 
with directly elected leaders receive higher wages than those without and 2) direct union 
elections are positively correlated with worker satisfaction. Additional evidences suggest 
that effects of direct elections work through stronger union leadership and harmonious 
industrial relations, resembling the voice-response face of unionism. The effect of direct 
elections significantly weakens or disappears when we exclude the large firms from the 
analysis. Meanwhile, the effect of union membership regains its significance. We argue 
that direct elections are a government-sponsored experiment in which large firms are 
selected to form an incentive-compatible framework among local governments, firms, 
and workers for explaining union effects with Chinese characteristics.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
It is widely accepted that trade unions increase the economic wellbeing of their members 
at the cost of firms. However, understanding the role of unions is a long-standing and 
controversial debate among economists since the 1970s. The two faces of unionism, i.e., 
the monopolistic face and the “collective voice-institutional response face,” are two 
competing theories for analyzing the union effects in the labor market (Friedman 1972; 
Freeman 1976; Borjas 1979; Freeman and Medoff 1984; Hirsch 2004). Both theories 
adopt the union-centered approach and elaborate the game played between unions and 
firms. However, their explanatory powers are seriously restrained in the case of trade 
unions with Chinese characteristics. In this study, we argue that the role of local 
governments must be included in the analysis to form a complete picture so as to 
demystify the effects of direct union elections in China. Specifically, direct union 
elections are a government-sponsored experiment in which large firms are selected as the 
main targets for having stronger union leadership and harmonious industrial relations. As 
a matter of fact, the direct elections form an incentive-compatible framework among 
local governments, firms and workers. In addition, we assert that the direct union 
elections are an economic innovation rather than a democratic movement as perceived in 
the literature of politics and laws (Chen et al. 2004; Wang 2004; Pringle 2011). 
 
One important challenge faced by the empirical literature on union effects is to identify 
the causal effects or tease out the unobserved differences between union and non-union 
workers. In the United States, unions tend to win elections either at highly successful 
firms or vulnerable firms facing difficulties, resulting in selection and omitted variable 
biases for identifying the union effects. DiNardo and Lee (2004) and Sojourner et al. 
(2015) address the non-random unionization in the United States by introducing the 
regression discontinuity design and using close union elections as a natural experiment 
for manufacturing and service sectors. Interestingly, DiNardo and Lee (2004) find no 
significant economic impact on the employers in the manufacturing sector, whereas 
Sojourner et al. (2015) confirm that unionization does increase labor productivity in the 
service sector, at least in the case of nursing homes. In China, systematic differences 
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between unionized and non-unionized firms are embedded in the Trade Union Law, with 
firms with more than 25 workers being required to have trade union representation. 
Unlike the market nature of non-random unionization (i.e., bargaining between unions 
and firms) in the West, non-randomness in China is imposed by the All-China Federation 
of Trade Unions (ACFTU), a functional department of the central government in China. 
For example, state-owned and large firms tend to establish unions and provide 
satisfactory working conditions to workers in compliance with the political requirements 
from the upper level trade unions and the Communist Party of China. Unsurprisingly, 
unionized firms perform better because of selection in size due to the mandatory feature 
of unionization in China. Using matched employer–employee data, we examine the 
effects of direct union elections on workers’ economic wellbeing and address the 
selection biases by using bias-adjusted tests and Propensity Score Matching (PSM) 
method. This study finds positive effects of direct union elections on workers’ economic 
wellbeing, such as wages and job satisfaction. We also find evidence regarding the 
positive effects of direct union elections on firm performance, especially labor 
productivity. 
 
Data constraint, at least for China, is another challenge for identifying the causal impacts 
of unionization. For instance, Yao and Zhong (2013) can capture merely the positive 
union effects on firms’ average wage and welfare because only firm-level data are used. 
Given the mandatory feature of unionization in China, unions could organize at state-
owned and large firms that can afford to pay higher wages to their workers than other 
firms. Thus, examining the impacts of unionization by firm-level data may be insufficient 
and subject to selection bias in the Chinese context. Few studies combine firm-level 
analysis with worker level effect, and the interpretation of union effects depends crucially 
on both. Using matched employer–employee data, we can control both firm attributes and 
worker characteristics in our ordinary least squares (OLS) estimations and examine both 
firm and worker level effects in our paper rather than the previous papers. We also assess 
the impacts of unobserved variables on the robustness of our OLS results and adjust self-
selection biases by using the PSM method. However, despite our efforts in analyzing the 
4 
 
treatment effects and identifying causal effects, the estimations are still subjected to 
biases due to the cross-sectional feature of our data.  
 
In this study, we pay particular attention to the organization of grassroots unions in China 
rather than to union density, i.e., membership rate, which measures union power in 
specific industries and local labor markets in the conventional literature (Hirsch and 
Addison 1986; Stewart 1990; Booth 1995). There are two reasons. The practical reason is 
that union density is extremely high in China, with nearly full membership rate in 
unionized firms and the involvement of almost three quarters of urban workers.
2
 
Discussing whether being a union member matters is not that meaningful because 
formally employed workers are automatically granted union membership in the unionized 
firms in China. A more fundamental reason is that the Trade Union Law rules out 
discrimination between union and non-union members for collective bargaining, leaving 
little advantageous status for enjoying union membership in principle. No prevailing 
consensus has been reached in the empirical studies in China. Some studies question the 
genuineness of Chinese trade unions and suggest limited union roles in protecting 
workers’ interests by expanding already high union density (Xia 2004; Zhang 2009), 
whereas others claim to find evidence that trade unions in China have transformed and 
indeed can increase workers’ average wage as in the West (Ge 2014; Yao and Zhong 
2008; Yao et al. 2009; Yao and Zhong 2013). All aforementioned studies use the union 
membership of workers or union status of firms as key measures of unionization. By 
contrast, we focus on the effects of a new institutional arrangement, i.e., the direct 
elections of union chairs which are multicandidate elections for union representative 
committees and chairs on workers’ economic wellbeing. We believe that ascertaining 
how to effectively organize grassroots unions to protect workers’ rights and interests is a 
relevant and meaningful question in the Chinese context.  
 
The remainder of the paper is set out as follows. Section 2 introduces the rationale and 
the status quo of the direct elections of union chairs in China. Section 3 formulates three 
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 In 2015, union membership accounted for 96% of unionized firms’ employees and 73% of urban workers 
(see Appendix Figure A1 for more details on the trend since 2003). 
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testable hypotheses on the effect and mechanism of direct union elections for protecting 
workers’ rights and interests under the discussions about the two faces of unionism. 
Section 4 constructs the analytical framework, illustrates the econometric equation, and 
describes the data and variables. Section 5 presents the results, and Section 6 concludes. 
  
2. DIRECT ELECTIONS OF UNION CHAIRS IN CHINA 
 
The membership of grassroots trade unions in China has increased by more than threefold 
since 2000. In 2015, union members account for almost all employment in unionized 
firms and nearly three quarters of urban workers.
3
 At the same time, labor conflicts in 
China have increased and escalated from individual disputes to mass disturbances, e.g., 
Honda wildcat strike in 2010 and Foxconn suicides in 2011. Trust toward trade unions 
was low among migrant workers since union chairs were either appointed by the upper 
level trade unions or were relatives of private firm managers. Many collective actions, 
such as wildcat strikes, were spontaneously organized by informal institutions among 
migrant workers, such as the Association of Fellow Provincials or Fraternity Society 
(Tongxiang Hui or Xiongdi Hui). These actions inevitably increased the governance cost 
and caused social and political uncertainty for the Chinese government at all levels.  
 
Driven by these events, Chinese governments initiated new institutional arrangements 
within the union system to gain trust from workers and direct them back to formal 
institutions. Since 2000, several local federations of trade unions (Zhejiang in early 2000s 
and Guangdong in early 2010s) actively promoted one innovative institutional 
arrangement, i.e., the direct elections of the grassroots union chairs. The direct elections 
of union chairs opened channels for the workers to communicate and bargain with the 
firms. Consequently, workers’ economic wellbeing was improved, labor conflicts were 
attenuated, and informal and self-organized unions were defused and weakened. The 
direct elections of union chairs were considered a feasible reform to gain trust from 
workers at low costs.  
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 Please refer to Appendix Figure A1 for the number of union members and Appendix Figure A2 for the 
rate of union density from 2003 to 2015. 
6 
 
 
Direct elections of union chairs refers to the process in which workers nominate any 
candidate to stand for them in union positions, such as committee members, vice-chairs, 
and chairs. Workers then vote directly for their preferred candidates who must have more 
than half of the votes. Such process is called the “sea elections” method, which is 
considered the most democratic way of selecting grassroots union leaders (Howell 2006; 
2008). In practice, the election process varies across regions. Some have single round 
elections where workers directly elect the union chairs from multiple candidates, whereas 
others have two or more rounds of elections. In the latter, the first round is only for 
nominating and selecting the representative committee separately from different plants 
and production departments, leaving the selection of chairs from the committee to later 
rounds. For both cases, nominees must deliver public speeches to propose policy agenda 
for the workers if elected (Chen et al. 2004; Chan 2009; Pringle 2011; Wen 2014). The 
list of nominees must be reviewed and approved by the upper level trade unions. More or 
less, the selection of union chairs, at least on the surface, resembles the conventional 
democratic elections in the West.
4
  
 
Interestingly, early experiments of union chairs election can be traced back to the mid-
1980s. Several experiments were actively conducted in Lishu, Siping, Jilin Province and 
Shekou, Shenzhen, Guangdong Province. These experiments were interrupted in the late 
1980s due to the political turmoil in 1989. They restarted in the late 1990s and early 
2000s in Yuhang, Hangzhou and Yuyao, Ningbo, both in Zhejiang Province, where 
small- and medium-sized firms clustered in the exporting sector at that time (see Pringle 
2011 for more details). According to local union leaders, the requirement of foreign 
clients on labor protection and World Trade Organization (WTO) rules were the major 
reasons for rebooting the union reform. For example, a shoe-making firm called Yajia in 
Yuhang signed detailed contracts with its American and European clients in compliance 
with specific standards in labor protection, including workers’ age, working time, 
overtime pay, discrimination, security, and sanitation. To respond to the external 
                                                          
4
 “Direct election” is interchangeably referred to as “democratic election” in the media. This observation is 
particularly true for the union reform in the Pearl River Delta of Guangdong Province after 2010. In this 
paper, we use direct election because the quasi-democratic nature of the union chair election is debatable. 
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requirements, Yajia initiated union reform by implementing the direct election of a union 
chair in 2001. The first move after the establishment of the newly elected union was to 
make collective wage bargaining and implement performance-pay scheme in the firm. By 
linking wage growth to the growth of firm profits, the union significantly improved labor 
relations in the firm and successfully enhanced the labor productivity of the firm. Such 
union reforms were then expanded to other firms in the region, and the share of direct 
elections among unionized firms in Yuhang was reported to increase from 40% in 2003 
to 99% in 2009 and afterward (Xie et al. 2003; Wang 2004; Gao and Tang 2009).  
 
In the early 2010s, a new round of turbulent labor relations that were triggered by the 
widely-reported Foxconn suicides and Honda wildcat strike in Guangdong Province 
ignited the drive for union reform within the region. In 2012, direct election of a union 
chair in Ricoh Shenzhen was set as a role model for other firms by Provincial Governor 
Wang Yang. Consequently, 163 firms with more than 1000 workers were selected to 
expand the experiments of direct union elections more widely in Shenzhen. In May 2012, 
the campaign of direct union elections in Ohm Shenzhen drew considerable attention 
from the media as a breakthrough for establishing a genuine union for electing a union 
chair who was one of the migrant workers in representing workers’ rights and interests. 
In 2014, 5000 firms conducted direct elections of union chairs in Guangdong, 
representing 2% of all unionized firms there. Expansion of such experiments were 
planned to make them common in the following five years in Guangdong (Zhang et al. 
2012; Zhang and Zhao 2012; Huang and Yao 2014; Wen 2014).  
 
In a nutshell, rapid growth of the manufacturing sector, continual decline of state-owned 
firms, and massive flows of rural migrant workers to coastal China over the last three 
decades are the main driving forces for union reform in the direction of democratic 
election. Researchers on politics, laws, and industrial relations predominantly approach 
the issue of direct elections from the perspective of democratic credibility and 
accountability (Chen et al. 2004; Wang 2004). Pringle (2011) argues that democratization 
is not the central issue per se and direct union elections serve as an important tool to be 
more responsive to workers’ grievances and more effective in negotiating a peaceful 
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resolution of those grievances. From the perspective of economics, direct union elections 
can be considered a successful means of improving labor relations and preventing 
conflicts (e.g., strikes) in the experimental regions like Zhejiang and Guangdong because 
directly elected chairs are believed to have stronger incentives to raise union members’ 
economic wellbeing relative to appointed chairs.  
 
3. HYPOTHESES ON THE EFFECTS OF DIRECT UNION ELECTIONS 
 
It is against this backdrop that we test four hypotheses on the effects of direct union 
elections in China. Our aim is to establish whether direct union elections enhance 
workers’ economic wellbeing, and whether the effects of direct union elections can be 
explained using insights from the two faces of unionism that dominate the conventional 
literature on the roles of trade unions. The empirical strategy and data we use to test these 
hypotheses are described in Section 4. 
 
3.1: Union members with directly elected leaders receive higher wages than those 
without. 
3.2: Direct union elections are positively correlated with workers’ other rights and 
benefits. 
 
The two faces of unionism involve competing theories to explain the feature of trade 
unions in the West, and they have become the standard analytical framework for studying 
union effects in the labor market (Hirsch 2004). In the view of the monopolistic face, 
unions raise the wages of their members but prevent effective allocation of labor market 
resources and worsen the labor conditions of non-union members (Friedman 1972). In the 
view of the “collective voice-institutional response” face, unions provide workers with a 
collective voice that elicits institutional responses from the management and improves 
labor relations by increasing training of special skills and preventing adverse selection 
and moral hazards of workers, thereby increasing the levels of productivity and equality 
between labor and capital (Freeman 1976; Borjas 1979; Freeman and Medoff 1984). 
Recent studies have focused on the roles of union election for enhancing union power in 
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the play of collective voice (Miller and Mulvey 1991; Batt et al. 2002; Iverson and 
Currivan 2003; Addison and Belfield 2004; Gunderson 2005; Lewin 2005; Benson and 
Brown 2010). 
  
However, the mainstream union-centered approach may be misleading for China. The 
framework of two faces of unionism to China should not be directly applied without deep 
understanding of the unique institutional arrangements of Chinese unions. Hui and Chan 
(2015) argue that the dynamics among the quadripartite actors, i.e., party-state, upper-
level trade unions, capital, and labor, shaped the strike-driven direct elections in 
Guangdong in 2010s. Trade unions at the upper level are functional departments of the 
government which bear the same hierarchical, personnel, and fiscal system as any other 
bureaucratic agency. For simplicity, we regard the party-state and upper-level trade 
unions as a single level which we label “local government.” We discuss the direct 
elections of union chairs under an incentive-compatible framework among local 
governments, firms (representing capital), and workers (representing labor) in China.  
 
Local governments are key institutional foundations of the economic system of China. 
Xu (2011) describes the governance structure of the Chinese economy as “regionally 
decentralized authoritarian,” and Cheung (2009) emphasizes the decentralized feature as 
“county competition.” The major goal of the local government is to promote local 
economic development under the constraint of socio-political stability. The local 
government supplies firms with cheap land, labor, and infrastructure and in return 
extracts taxes from successful firms.
5
 As firms become larger, the increasing tension 
between capital and labor poses a greater constraint on the socio-political stability to the 
locality and its government. For instance, a workers’ strike in a large firm, is considered a 
“mass disturbance” threatening social stability for which local government officials 
should take full responsibility. Local governments therefore have strong incentives to 
prevent or mitigate such potential collective actions by introducing direct union elections 
as a reform measure.  
                                                          
5
 It is well-known that indirect value-added taxes from firms are the main sources of fiscal revenue of 
Chinese local governments.  
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As for profit-maximizing firms, strikes are costly, at least in economic terms. The optimal 
choice for large firms is therefore to accept the government-sponsored experiment of 
direct union elections because such election is less costly than potential strikes. By 
introducing direct union elections, these firms may benefit from better labor relations and 
higher labor productivity in the long term (Lu et al. 2010; Wei et al. 2013; Ge 2014). 
Workers can also benefit from direct union elections by increasing workers’ economic 
wellbeing. Therefore, it is also rational for workers to welcome the directly elected chairs 
who they elect through democratic votes.  
 
In short, direct union elections form an incentive-compatible framework among local 
governments, firms, and workers. Using this tripartite framework, we anticipate positive 
effects of direct union elections on workers’ economic wellbeing. We first test the 
positive effects of direct union elections on workers’ wages. We then test the positive 
effects of direct union elections on workers’ other rights and benefits, such as labor 
conditions, worker development, and worker satisfaction.  
 
3.3: The effects work through stronger union leadership and harmonious industrial 
relations. 
3.4: The effects work through large firms for a tripartite incentive-compatible framework. 
 
If direct union elections can help raise the economic wellbeing of union members and 
workers, we further test the underlying channels through which the effects of direct union 
elections work. Four channels are possible. First, workers may be more willing to 
actively participate in union affairs and seek support from unions if the chairs are directly 
elected instead of appointed. Second, directly elected union chairs are believed to have 
strong incentives to appeal to their constituencies, which can result in better welfare for 
workers. As the political economy literature suggests, the working class benefits from 
organized and competitive electoral politics by enjoying high income growth and 
generous social welfare (Jennings 1979; Besley et al. 2010). Third, directly elected union 
chairs better represent the collective voice and therefore exert more bargaining power 
11 
 
relative to appointed counterparts. Fourth, in the Chinese context, the acceptance of direct 
union elections by a firm is an indication of positive management response to workers’ 
demands for better economic wellbeing. At the very least, the management acknowledges 
the role of directly elected union leaders in coordinating labor relations between workers 
and managers in the hope of increasing labor productivity. The last two channels imply 
that the voice-response face of unionism may play a role in making direct union elections 
effective. As we lack data on workers’ participation in union affairs and the competitive 
election process, we can only test the last two channels in which the effects of direct 
union election work through stronger union leadership and harmonious industrial 
relations. 
 
However, we must remain cautious when directly applying the two faces of unionism to 
China for two reasons. First, trade unions in China are known to have insufficient 
bargaining power from lack of independence (Clarke and Pringle 2009; Sun and He 2012; 
Ge 2014; Wei et al. 2015). Chinese trade unions are not strong enough to promote 
democratic local elections. Second, allowing direct union elections is also implausible in 
China when firms’ management is too weak to play the voice-response face of unionism. 
The drive for direct union elections in China can only be explained as a government-
sponsored experiment in which large firms are selected as the main targets to form an 
incentive-compatible framework among local governments, firms, and workers. By 
introducing the role of the government, the tripartite framework can better explain both 
the cause of direct union elections and its effectiveness in a consistent manner.  
 
In this tripartite framework, firm size is an important but possibly overlooked element for 
explaining the effects of direct union elections. If firm size is not large enough, despite 
serious tensions between labor and capital, firms will find it easier to handle such 
conflicts by dismissing undesirable workers, and such action will have no significant 
social impact to the local city and its government. Therefore, direct union elections were 
less desirable in 1990s when most firms were relatively small in size. It is not a 
coincidence that growing firm size played an important role in triggering union 
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experiments in Zhejiang in the early 2000s due to WTO accession and in Guangdong in 
the early 2010s due to wildcat strikes.  
 
Workers in large firms have stronger bargaining power through collective actions (e.g., 
strikes) than those in small- and medium-sized firms. In our tripartite framework, the 
strong bargaining power of workers will exert pressure on firms and can also threaten the 
social stability of the locality and its government, which, in turn, places more pressure on 
firms to accept direct union elections. Direct elections could be effective in improving 
workers’ economic wellbeing in large firms relative to small- and medium sized firms. 
For the latter, even if they adopt direct union elections, the workers’ bargaining power 
may not be strong enough to trigger the above cycle. In this case, local governments may 
not be concerned by labor disputes and firms have no incentive to make direct union 
elections effective. We therefore expect no substantive effects of direct union elections 
for small- and medium-sized firms. In other words, the positive election effects are 
mainly driven by large firms.  
 
4. EMPRICAL SPECIFICATION AND DATA DESCRIPTION 
 
4.1 Types of Union Participation and Wage Differences 
In Figure 1, we classify three types of union participation for affecting workers’ 
economic wellbeing: union status, union membership, and direct union elections. Union 
status of firms distinguishes unionized firms with non-unionized ones. Union 
membership of workers differentiates between union and non-union members. Finally, 
direct union elections refer to the election of senior union officials by the workforce. 
These types of union participation inevitably correlate with both observed and 
unobserved firm and worker attributes which will create endogeneity issues.  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
 
We classify workers who are not union members as Type N workers and union members 
as Type M workers. We further divide unionized firms according to whether the union 
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chair is directly elected by union members or not (Type 1 equals not directly elected and 
Type 2 equals directly elected).
6
 Therefore, we are able to classify four types of workers 
by combining union membership and direct union elections information (see Figure 1). 
Type N1 workers are non-union members whose union chairs are not directly elected. 
Type N2 workers are non-union members whose union chairs are directly elected. Type 
M1 workers are union members whose union chairs are not directly elected. Finally, 
Type M2 workers are union members whose union chairs are directly elected. The main 
task of the paper is to examine the effects of direct union elections on union members by 
comparing wage and welfare differences between Types M1 and M2 workers. This work 
also examines the effects of direct elections on all workers (union and non-union 
members) by comparing wage and welfare differences between Type (N1+M1) and Type 
(N2+M2) workers. 
 
4.2 Empirical Strategy 
In light of Figure 1 and Table 1, the empirical equation of the union effects can be 
expressed as follows.  
 
ijjijikij FITY                                                              (1) 
 
where Yij is worker i’s economic wellbeing in firm j. Ii is a vector of observed workers’ 
individual characteristics. Fj is a vector of observed firm attributes. μi is the unobserved 
worker heterogeneity, and μj is the unobserved firm heterogeneity. μij is the remaining 
error term. Tk is a vector of worker type dummies.   
 
As mentioned in the Introduction, systematic differences between unionized and non-
unionized firms are endogenously embedded in the Trade Union Law, with the 
mandatory requirement of unionizing firms with more than 25 workers. This situation 
                                                          
6
 Our survey asks questions about ways of selecting union chairs. Choices include: 1) appointed by upper 
union or other governmental organization, 2) appointed by the firm owner or managerial board, 3) elected 
by a worker committee or union members after recommendation by the upper union or governmental 
organization, 4) elected by a worker committee or union members after competitive and public campaigns, 
and 5) others. In this paper, we define the fourth option as the “direct and democratic” election of union 
chairs and the other four options as the “indirect and non-democratic election” of union chairs. 
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implies that unionized firms are systematically larger than non-unionized firms. 
Therefore, the estimated unionized effects in the previous studies (e.g., Yao and Zhong 
2013) may be biased by unobserved firm heterogeneity, i.e., μj. Data used in this study 
also indicate statistically significant differences between unionized and non-unionized 
firms in many aspects, including firm ownership, firm size, and labor relations (see 
Appendix Table B1). If such systematic differences are not taken care of, then a serious 
endogeneity problem may occur by solely comparing unionized versus non-unionized 
firms. In the empirical analysis, this work excludes non-unionized firms and examines the 
union effects by comparing union versus non-union members. Since trade unions in 
China are organized in a top-down structure rather than the bottom-up structures in 
western countries, workers’ selection into unionized firms is not a serious issue in the 
Chinese context. Simple exclusion of non-unionized firms will not cause serious selection 
bias. Thus, the endogeneity issue triggered by firm heterogeneity, i.e., μj, will be 
attenuated and the estimation bias will be smaller.  
 
In China, workers have no choice regarding membership in the trade unions. Once 
workers are formally employed by unionized firms, they are automatically granted union 
membership. Only those short-term contract workers or dispatched workers have no 
union membership in the unionized firms. Therefore, workers’ selection into union 
membership is inapplicable in China. Moreover, we confine our analysis to union 
members and examine the effects of direct union elections by comparing directly elected 
union chairs versus non-directly elected counterparts. Therefore, the endogeneity issues 
triggered by both firm and individual heterogeneity, i.e., μi and μj, will be attenuated 
further and the estimation bias will be smaller. 
 
In addition, trade unions in China serve multi-task roles, such as supporting socio-
economic development, participating in national affairs as the representative of workers, 
and educating workers in multi-dimensions (Trade Union Constitution 2013). In a multi-
task environment, trade unions in China may act under conflicting objectives that are not 
easy to disentangle. Therefore, comprehensive dimensions such as labor conditions, 
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worker development, and worker satisfaction are also examined along with workers’ 
wages.  
 
4.3 Data Collection and Variable Description 
Our data are from the 2012 Hangzhou Labor Relations Survey conducted by the former 
Center for Labor Economics and Public Policy Studies at Zhejiang University. It covers 
504 firms in 14 districts of Hangzhou, which includes 9 municipal districts and 5 
subordinate counties. This survey combines two sets of questionnaires, including the 
employer-level questionnaire called Implementation Status of Firm’s Labor Relations 
(Qiye Laodong Guanxi Zhixing Qingkuang) and the employee-level questionnaire called 
Opinion Poll of Harmonious Status of Labor Relations (Laodong Guanxi Hexie 
Qingkuang Minyi Diaocha).  
 
The survey was conducted as follows. First, we drew a 0.5% random sample of all 
100800 firms in 14 districts of Hangzhou on the basis of the sampling number in each 
district from the ratio of the non-agriculture population in each district to total non-
agriculture population in Hangzhou. To consider firm heterogeneity, we stratified firms 
in each district into four layers according to different firm sizes and then drew systematic 
sampling from each layer. Second, once decided on the sampling firms, we drew random 
samples of all workers in each firm. The number of sampling workers was in accord with 
firm size. Specifically, we sampled 15 workers for firms with more than 200 workers, 10 
workers for firms with 50 to 199 workers, 5 for firms with 10 to 49 workers, and 3 
workers for firms with 5 to 9 workers. We excluded middle managers and senior 
managers. The sampling scheme above ensured the randomness of the firm. However, the 
sampling of workers may continue to be disproportionately represented. We addressed 
this issue by incorporating sampling weights in later regressions. Specifically, sampling 
weights were calculated by the ratio of the actual firm size to the sampled size.  
 
The firm-level survey was conducted with the assistance of the Labor Inspection Team of 
Hangzhou (Hangzhou Laodong Baozhang Jiancha Zhidui), a governmental department, 
thereby ensuring high quality of firm-level information. The employee-level survey was 
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conducted by one-to-one interviews and the questionnaires were filled by student 
surveyors from Zhejiang University, thereby ensuring high quality of individual level 
information. Moreover, we separated the employee-level survey from the employer-level 
survey, which precluded managerial influence and guaranteed independence between the 
two surveys.  
 
Finally, this survey collected 504 firm questionnaires and 3996 worker questionnaires to 
form a matched employer–employee data set. 7  As mentioned, we find systematic 
differences between unionized and non-unionized firms in our data, which may cause a 
potential endogeneity problem (see Appendix Table B1). Therefore, we excluded the 118 
non-unionized firms and the 643 workers in these firms. We further excluded the 107 
workers who did not respond or know relevant information such as wages, union 
membership, gender, Hukou, and education. For outliers, we first excluded the 54 
workers who are not in the working age (below 16 and above 65). We then excluded the 
39 workers who work less than 80 hours (including those less than 9 days) and more than 
360 hours per month. Then, we excluded the 14 workers whose hourly wages were lower 
than 6.5 yuan because the hourly minimum wage in Hangzhou is 10.7 yuan in 2011. 
Finally, 386 unionized firms and 2857 workers were left for regression analysis.  
 
The main outcome variable of interest is the log of hourly wages, which includes bonuses 
and stipends in cash but not in kind. Hourly wages are monthly wages divided by the 
product of the number of working days in a month and the number of working hours in a 
day. The other outcome variables we examine are: monthly working hours, whether 
workers receive free checkups, whether workers receive on-the-job training, their 
satisfaction with social security, and their overall satisfaction. Table 1 presents the 
definitions of all variables.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
                                                          
7
 Initially, the response rate of firm was 99.4%. We searched additional online information of two firms and 
recover the response rate to 100%. 
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We include both individual and firm attributes as control variables in Equation (1). The 
individual attributes of workers include age, gender, hukou, education, political status, 
seniority, and occupation. Firm attributes include ownership, size, history, location, 
industry, and skill intensity. Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of all variables.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
Furthermore, Table 3 presents the average wage differences among the different types of 
workers. The wages of union members (Type M) are 10.3% higher than those of non-
union members (Type N). Among union members, wages are 8.6% higher for those with 
directly elected union chairs (Type M2) than those without (Type M1). The wages of 
union members with directly elected chairs (Type M2) are 17.5% higher than those of 
non-union members whose union chairs are appointed (Type N1). Union members with 
directly elected chairs enjoy the highest wages. Moreover, workers whose union chairs 
are directly elected receive (Type N2+M2) 8.3% higher wages than those workers 
without directly elected union chairs (Type N1+M1).  
 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
 
5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
Hypothesis 1 – Union members with directly elected leader receive higher wages than 
those without. 
Table 4 presents the results of the OLS method in estimating the effects of direct union 
elections on wages after adjusting the sampling weights. Column 1 in Table 4 indicates 
that union members with a directly elected leader receive 10.1% higher wages than those 
without. Unsurprisingly, we find no significant union membership effect after controlling 
the effect of direct union elections. This outcome can be attributed to the high union 
density in the unionized firms where only those short-term contract workers or dispatched 
workers have no union membership. From an individual perspective, male workers, those 
that are highly educated, managers, technicians, and senior workers tend to have 
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relatively high wages. From a firm perspective, large firms located in municipal districts, 
which are not privately owned and have high skill intensity tend to provide relatively 
high wages to their workers. These results are consistent with the firm and labor theories, 
and are in line with our expectations. Moreover, the effects of union membership and 
direct union elections are almost identical when we exclude Type N2 workers, i.e., non-
union members with directly elected union chairs (Column 2 in Table 4).
8
  
 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
 
Thus far, our analysis is confined to the effects of direct elections on union members. 
According to the Trade Union Constitution 2013, the basic duty of the Chinese trade 
unions is to protect the legitimate rights and interests of all workers rather than of union 
members only. Therefore, the wage effects of direct union elections, in principle, should 
apply to non-union members. Table 5 further compares the wage differences between 
workers with directly elected union chairs and those without. The average hourly wages 
of workers whose union chairs are directly elected are 9.6% higher than those without 
directly elected union chairs. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
 
One concern is that direct union elections can be more superficial in state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) than in other firms (Nichols and Zhao 2010). If the direct elections of 
union chairs in SOEs are only political shows, the positive effects in SOEs may be driven 
by those features associated with state ownership rather than the election itself. To 
address the potential endogeneity, we simply excluded the sample of SOEs. The 
estimation results are shown in Column 3 in Table 4 and Column 2 in Table 5. The 
positive effects of direct union elections still hold (10.6% in both Table 4 and 5). These 
results can be attributed to the relative scarcity of SOEs in our sample (6.7%) and the low 
                                                          
8
 Only 68 workers were non-union members with directly elected union chairs. We tested for robustness by 
excluding them because they are few.  
19 
 
incidence of direct union elections (14.7%) within SOEs.
9
 In principle, state ownership 
implies that a stated-owned firm and all its workers belong to the state, and that the union 
only serves as a bridge between workers and management. In practice, union chairs in 
SOEs are communist party cadres who enjoy high hierarchical rankings in the personnel 
system. The direct elections of union chairs are less desirable in SOEs and thus has less 
impact on workers’ wages.  
 
Another concern is that the effects of direct elections may be captured only through 
foreign-owned enterprises (FOEs). Many trials of direct union elections in Guangdong 
may have been implemented in FOEs simply because they had more knowledge and 
experience in selecting union chairs in a democratic way. If this is the case, we then 
would observe no effect of direct elections after excluding the sample of FOEs. As shown 
in Column 4 in Table 4 and Column 3 in Table 5, the positive effects of direct union 
elections are almost the same for union members (10.4%) and slightly smaller for all 
workers (9.1%).
10
 The results can also be attributed to the relative scarcity of FOEs in our 
sample (10.7%), although the share of direct union elections is relatively high in FOEs 
(31.9%). After excluding FOEs, the R-squared decreases from 0.27 to 0.22, indicating 
some explanatory power for having FOEs. These outcomes imply that unions in FOEs 
may bear more resemblance to their counterparts in western countries for protecting 
workers’ rights and interests, especially for union members.  
 
Direct union elections may be correlated with unobserved variables, such as a firm’s 
governance structure. Therefore, the estimated effects of direct union elections by OLS 
may be biased. Although worker and firm attributes are controlled for in our OLS 
analysis, omitted variable biases may still occur. Following the seminal work of Altonji 
et al. (2005) (hereafter AET), Oster (2017) develops the approach for evaluating the 
robustness to omitted variable bias under the assumption that selection on observables is 
                                                          
9
 The low share of SOEs in our sample is justifiable because private economy dominates in Zhejiang 
Province where Hangzhou is the capital city.  
10
 The low share of FOEs in our sample is justifiable because private economy dominates in Zhejiang 
Province where Hangzhou is the capital city. 
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informative about selection on unobservables. We apply their approach and present the 
results of biased-adjusted treatment effects of direct union elections in Table 6.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
 
In Table 6, the controlled treatment effect of direct union elections is 10.1%, which 
remains significantly positive and is smaller relative to the uncontrolled treatment effect 
of 17.5% (full specification in Columns 1 and 2). Oster (2017) points out that coefficient 
stability must be combined with information about R-squared movements to develop an 
argument. In our case, R-squared increases from 0.037 to 0.274 when the controls are 
introduced in the full specification.  
 
Following Oster (2017), we conducted two sets of robustness tests. We first calculated 
the identified set for controlled treatment effects when the relative degree of selection on 
observed and unobserved variables (δ) was set as one and R-squared from a full set 
regression of the outcome on treatment and observed and unobserved controls (Rmax) was 
set as 1.3R
2
. We find that the lower bounding value of the identified set is still large in 
size and bigger than zero. Alternatively, we calculated δ when the treatment effect was 
set as zero. To make the treatment effect zero, δ must be 3.565, which indicates a much 
larger impact of unobservables than observables. Both tests suggest that selection on 
unobservables cannot seriously bias the effects of direct union elections on workers’ 
wages in our OLS regressions. Similar results are shown in Table 6 in which we excluded 
the samples of SOEs and POEs.  
 
By supposing that all the unobserved variables can be captured by the wages of the 
previous year, we can set the lowest possible value for Rmax if we regress the workers’ 
monthly wage in 2012 by the monthly wage in 2011. According to the regression result, 
the lowest possible R-squared is 0.59. Then, we calculated the identified sets and values 
of δ when Rmax was set as 0.59. Except for excluding SOEs, all identified sets do not 
include zero, although the lower bounding values became relatively small. Alternative 
tests indicate that all values of δ are bigger than one if the treatment effect is set as zero. 
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These tests further indicate that selection on unobservables does not significantly change 
our OLS results. We also examined the impacts on the wage differences between workers 
with directly elected union chairs and those without (Table 7). The results are consistent 
with those of Table 6, again suggesting the robustness of the effects of direct union 
elections. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE] 
 
Since direct elections are a government-sponsored selection process, the selection could 
also be jointly determined by firm and worker attributes. These attributes may also affect 
workers’ wages, thereby causing systematic wage differences among the four types of 
workers. Alternatively, if workers expect wages increase if they directly select their union 
chairs, they will actively promote the direct elections of union chairs. To further test the 
robustness of our OLS results, we used PSM method to adjust for the self-selection biases 
mentioned above.
11
 Following Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd’s (1997, 1998a, 1998b), we 
specifically used local linear regression matching to estimate the effects of direct union 
elections on workers’ wages, which involve the average treatment effects on the treated 
(ATT). Following the PSM method, we first calculated the propensity scores by 
regressing the probability of direct union elections on firm and worker attributes using a 
logistic model (Dehejia and Wahba 1999). Then, we compared the wage differences 
between Type M2 workers (the treatment group) and Type M1 workers (the control 
group). Table 8 shows the ATT results using local linear regression matching method.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 8 HERE] 
 
All our PSM estimations passed the balance test (see Appendix Figure A3 for more 
details). The effects of direct union elections remain positive and significant at the 1% 
level. Specifically, the ATT of the full sample indicates that direct union elections can 
increase the hourly wages of union members by 6.1%. Similarly, the ATT when 
                                                          
11
 For more discussion on the effectiveness of the propensity score matching method, please refer to 
Angrist and Pischke (2009, pp.80–91) and Guo and Fraser (2010).  
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excluding sample of SOEs and FOEs are 7.5% and 5.4%, respectively. Although the 
PSM method can eliminate overt bias rather than hidden bias, the PSM effects in our 
analysis are consistent with OLS estimates but smaller in magnitude.  
 
In a nutshell, we attempted to address the potential endogeneity issue due to unobserved 
variables and self-selection by using the AET and PSM approaches. The two approaches 
confirm our OLS results in testing the first hypothesis that union members and workers 
with directly elected leader receive higher wages than those without.  
 
Hypothesis 2 – Direct union elections are positively correlated with workers’ other rights 
and benefits. 
 
Increasing workers’ economic wellbeing should not only be confined to wages because 
Chinese unions serve multi-task roles. Therefore, we further analyzed the effects of direct 
union elections on other dimensions, such as labor conditions, the employment system, 
worker development, and worker satisfaction. We used the monthly working hours of 
workers and whether or not workers received regular free body checkups as the proxies 
of the labor conditions. We argue that working hours reflect working intensity and 
regular free checkups reflect the extent of the firm’s focus on labor conditions. We 
employed satisfaction about social security as a proxy for the employment system.
12
 We 
believe that the satisfaction about social security indicates the overall participation in 
social security and whether or not a firm contributes sufficient social security payments 
in accordance with laws and regulations. We utilized the presence or absence of on-the-
job training organized by the firm as the proxy of worker development. We assert that 
firm training is a main way for workers to accumulate human capital. In addition, we 
employed average satisfaction scores on several indicators (such as the firm’s welfare, 
social security, holiday system, fulfillment of labor contracts, and democratic 
management) as a proxy for worker satisfaction. Table 9 presents the estimation results of 
OLS and logit regression. 
                                                          
12
 We initially intended to use the signing rate of labor contracts and participation rate of social security as 
proxies. However, near full coverage rates are found in Hangzhou, which present insufficient variations.  
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[INSERT TABLE 9 HERE] 
 
The results in Table 9 show that after controlling firm and workers’ characteristics, the 
union members work fewer hours, receive more free checkups, and more on-the-job 
training. These results indicate that joining a union is helpful for improving labor 
conditions and promoting worker development. But we do not observe significant 
differences in working hours, free checkups, and on-the-job training between union 
members with and without directly elected union chairs. However, direct union elections 
are positively correlated with worker satisfaction. In other words, union members with 
directly elected chairs are more satisfied with their social security system and other 
indicators than those without. We find similar results in Table 10 where we compare the 
differences for all workers rather than only union members.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 10 HERE] 
 
Our results therefore suggest that union membership enhances non-economic welfare, 
whereas direct union elections play a minor role in further enhancing these benefits. 
Unexpectedly, the effects of direct union elections mainly concentrate on worker 
satisfaction. We claim that direct union elections may encourage more worker 
participation in firm management such that workers have a high level of commitment and 
satisfaction in their firms. Accordingly, the voice-response face of unionism may play a 
role in making direct elections effective, which we test directly in the next hypothesis.  
 
Hypothesis 3 – The effects work through stronger union leadership and harmonious 
industrial relations. 
 
We further tested whether the “collective voice-institutional response” face of unionism 
can explain the working mechanisms behind the effects of direct union election. 
Specifically, we checked if the effects of direct union elections work through stronger 
union leadership and harmonious industrial relations. To do so, we compared the 
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differences between firms with directly elected chairs and without. Specifically, we 
compared firm performance, firm governance in labor relations, and individual attributes 
of union chairs between the two types of firm. The results are reported in Table 11.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 11 HERE] 
 
Firms with directly elected chairs have better performance, better governance in labor 
relations, and stronger union leaders than those without. Specifically, directly elected 
firms have significantly higher per capita output. These firms also are more open to 
publicize firm affairs to workers and more willing to settle labor disputes for workers. 
The directly elected union chairs are more educated and hold full-time positions rather 
than part-time ones. In comparing the differences between directly elected and non-
directly elected firms, we do not report the regression results by controlling the attributes 
of the firms and union leaders. Although some of the results are consistent with the 
simple statistical comparison in Table 11, the regression results are not very robust 
because the sample size of the firms is relatively small and firm performance variables 
are subject to many missing values.  
 
Interestingly, these results seem to be consistent with the “collective voice-institutional 
response” face of unionism. First, the results imply that directly elected union leaders are 
better at coordinating labor relations between workers and managers as they show full 
commitment and truly represent the collective voices of workers. Second, understanding 
that direct union elections can enhance the labor productivity of the firm, firm 
management is more willing to provide positive responses to workers’ demand for better 
economic wellbeing, e.g., better labor dispute settlements and more public information of 
firm affairs. Therefore, direct union elections, as an innovative institutional arrangement, 
provides a working mechanism for increasing workers’ economic wellbeing through 
stronger union leadership and harmonious industrial relations.  
 
Hypothesis 4 – The effects work through large firms for a tripartite incentive-compatible 
framework. 
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We have argued that direct elections in China are a government-sponsored experiment in 
which large firms are selected as the main targets to form an incentive-compatible 
framework among local governments, firms and workers. Here, selecting large firms is 
the key prerequisite for making direct union elections effective. In other words, only 
direct union elections in large firms can form the tripartite incentive-compatible 
framework.  
 
Anecdotal evidences in the real world practice of the reform on direct union elections 
also suggest that firm size appears to be an important factor. For example, the chairperson 
of the Yuhang Federation of Trade Unions pointed out that “other than complying with 
WTO rules, firm growth to a certain size in Yuhang makes direct union elections 
necessary” (Xie et al. 2003). Such observation is more obvious in that 163 firms with 
more than 1000 workers were explicitly selected for the second stage of the expansion of 
the initial experiment of direct union elections in Ricoh Shenzhen (Zhang et al. 2012).  
 
One way to test this mechanism is to check whether the effects of direct union elections 
still hold when excluding large firms with more than 200 workers in our sample. The 
initial results can be found in Column (5) in Table 4. After excluding the large firms in 
our sample, the effect of direct union elections decreases from 10.1% to 4.5% and is 
significant only at the 10% level. On the contrary, the effect of union membership 
becomes significant, which indicates that union members receive 10.7% higher wages 
than non-union members for small- and medium-sized firms. This outcome implies that 
direct union elections are effective mainly for large firms and union membership plays a 
central role in explaining workers’ wage differences for small- and medium-sized firms. 
Similarly, the average hourly wages of workers whose union chairs are directly elected 
are only 4.8% higher than those without directly elected union chairs after excluding the 
large firms (see Column (4) in Table 5). Moreover, bias-adjusted regression results are 
consistent and very close to OLS estimates (see Tables 6 and 7). If we use PSM method, 
the effect of direct union elections is no longer significant after excluding large firms. 
This finding further indicates that firm size is important for explaining the mechanism of 
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direct union elections on increasing workers’ economic wellbeing. A complete picture for 
explaining the effects of direct union elections is needed to ascertain the role of the local 
government in selecting large firms as targets for settling labor relations in China. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
Unlike trade unions in western countries, those in China are organized in a top-down 
structure where grassroots trade unions, the focus of our paper, are positioned at the 
bottom. The grassroots trade unions are distinctive in the sense that they lack 
independence, are subject to government regulation, have higher union density, and serve 
multi-task roles. Despite these differences, trade unions in China are transforming and 
restructuring their role in response to intense labor relations that began in the new century 
(Clarke 2005). Direct elections of union chairs are one of the prominent efforts to 
attenuate conflicts between workers and capitalists and increase workers’ economic 
wellbeing. After reviewing the short history of direct union elections in China, this work 
argues that rapid growth of the manufacturing sector, continual decline of state-owned 
firms, and massive flows of rural migrant workers to coastal China over the last three 
decades are the main driving forces for union reform in the direction of democratic 
elections. 
 
Using matched employer–employee data, this study examines the effects of direct union 
elections on workers’ economic wellbeing. Union members and workers with directly 
elected leaders receive higher wages than those without. Moreover, direct elections of 
union chairs are less desirable in SOEs and have less impact on workers’ wages. We 
argue that unions in FOEs may bear more resemblance to their counterparts in western 
countries for protecting workers’ rights and interests, especially for union members. Bias-
adjusted tests further indicate that the selection on unobservables does not significantly 
change our OLS results. The PSM effects are also consistent with OLS estimates but are 
smaller in magnitude. Furthermore, direct union elections are positively correlated with 
worker satisfaction but not with labor conditions and worker development.  
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Further evidence suggests that the effects of direct elections work through stronger union 
leadership and harmonious industrial relations, resembling the voice-response face of 
unionism. However, our empirical results further show that the effect of direct elections 
significantly weakens or disappears but the effect of union membership recovers its 
significance when we exclude the large firms in the analysis. These outcomes imply that 
firm size is the key to understanding the mechanism of direct union elections on 
increasing workers’ economic wellbeing. We assert that direct union elections are a 
government-sponsored experiment in which large firms are selected as the main targets 
for explaining the effects direct election with Chinese characteristics. Direct union 
elections form an incentive-compatible framework among local governments, firms, and 
workers, which differs from the two faces of unionism. 
 
Fundamentally, this study deepens the understanding of China’s trade unions and how 
institutional arrangements within the union system works to protect and improve workers’ 
economic wellbeing. Direct elections of union chairs are an excellent angle to transcend 
the two faces of unionism and the mainstream union-centered approach. The cause of the 
effects of direct union elections is neither from the union’s monopolistic power, nor 
directly from the firm’s governance capacity but rather emerges from the government’s 
selection of large firms as targets for implementing the union experiment. Direct union 
elections are not a sign of grassroots political democracy in China as perceived and 
suggested by researchers in politics and laws. Rather, such election is an effective 
innovation to form an economically incentive-compatible framework among tripartite the 
actors in China. 
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Figure 1: Framing Union Effects on Workers’ Economic Wellbeing 
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Table 1: Definition of the Variables 
Item Variable Unit/Item Definition 
Explained Variables (1): Wage 
 
Log of average 
hourly wage 
Yuan 
Log(monthly wage/monthly working hours); 
monthly working hours = monthly working days 
 daily working hours. 
Explained Variables (2): Welfare and benefits 
 
Monthly working 
hours 
Hour 
Log (monthly working hours); monthly working 
hours = monthly working days  daily working 
hours. 
Free checkups Binary 
Binary choice: whether or not receiving free 
checkups 
On-the-job training 
with salaries 
Binary  
Binary choice: whether or not receiving on-the-
job training with salaries. 
Satisfaction with 
social security 
Multinomial 
Ordinal choice: very satisfied, satisfied, neutral, 
unsatisfied, and very unsatisfied. 
Overall satisfaction Score 
The average satisfaction of the five systems 
(which include welfare, social security, holiday 
arrangement, labor contract, and management 
systems). Each system is rated as ordinals, with 5 
as very satisfied, 4 as satisfied, 3 as neutral, 2 as 
unsatisfied, and 1 as very unsatisfied. 
Key Explanatory Variables: Union related attributes 
 
Worker type 1/0 
Dummy variables: 1 for the Type N workers who 
are non-union members and 0 for others; 1 for the 
Type M1 workers who are union members whose 
union chairs are not directly elected and 0 for 
others; 1 for the Type M2 workers who are union 
members whose union chairs are directly elected 
and 0 for others. We set the Type M1 workers as 
the reference group. 
Direct union elections 1/0 
Dummy variables: 1 for the Type (N2+M2) 
workers whose union chairs are directly elected 
and 0 for the Type (N1+M1) workers whose 
union chairs are not directly elected. 
Control variables: Individual and firm attributes 
Individual 
attributes 
Age Year Age of workers. 
Age squared --- 
 
Gender 1/0 Dummy variables: 1 for female and 0 for male. 
Hukou 1/0 
Dummy variables: 1 for agriculture Hukou, and 0 
for non-agriculture Hukou. 
Education 1/0 
Dummy variables: 1 for junior school and below 
and 0 for others; 1 for high school and 0 for 
others; 1 for vocational school and 0 for others; 1 
for college and above and 0 for others. We set 
junior school and below as the reference group. 
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Communist Party 
membership 
1/0 
Dummy variable: 1 for party member and 0 for 
non-party member. 
Seniority Month Working time in the firm. 
Seniority squared --- 
 
Position 1/0 
Dummy variable: 1 for managers and technician 
and 0 for others. 
Firm 
attributes 
Ownership 1/0 
Dummy variables: 1 for state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) and 0 for others; 1 for foreign-owned 
enterprises (FOEs) and 0 for others; 1 for private-
owned enterprises (POEs) and 0 for others. We 
set SOEs as the reference group. 
Firm size 1/0 
Dummy variables: 1 for 50 workers or below and 
0 for others; 1 for 50–199 workers and 0 for 
others; 1 for 200 workers or above and 0 for 
others. We set 50 workers or below as the 
reference group. 
History Month Establishment of the firms in months. 
Region 1/0 
Dummy variable: 1 for subordinate counties of 
Hangzhou, and 0 for municipal districts. 
Industry 1/0 
Dummy variable: 1 for manufacturing industry, 
and 0 for others. 
Skill intensity Percent 
Share of workers with college degree or above 
from total workers. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable/Type Full B2 B1 A A2+B2 A1+ B1 
Explained Variables (1): Wage  
 
Average hourly 
wage 
16.768 18.963 16.171 15.852 18.827 16.082 
Log of average 
hourly wage 
2.744 2.871 2.709 2.691 2.861 2.705 
Explained Variables (2): Welfare and benefits 
 
Monthly working 
hours 
183.880 179.323 183.979 191.289 180.460 185.022 
Free checkups 0.594 0.613 0.622 0.422 0.597 0.592 
On-the-job training 0.550 0.582 0.574 0.380 0.570 0.543 
Overall satisfaction 4.314 4.544 4.259 4.182 4.535 4.240 
Satisfaction with 
social security 
4.291 4.501 4.243 4.160 4.490 4.224 
Key Explanatory Variables: Worker type 
 
Type N workers 0.130      
Type M1 workers 0.646      
 Type M2 workers 0.224      
 
Type N2+M2 
workers (direct 
union elections) 
0.248    
 
 
Control variables 
Individual 
Attributes 
Age 34.732 33.400 35.702 32.376 33.265 35.222 
Gender (female=1) 0.524 0.495 0.518 0.604 0.504 0.531 
Hukou 
(agriculture=1) 
0.463 0.434 0.460 0.532 0.444 0.470 
Education: Junior 
school or below 
0.234 0.200 0.250 0.212 0.200 0.245 
High school 0.147 0.133 0.155 0.137 0.135 0.152 
Vocational 
school 
0.123 0.116 0.128 0.115 0.116 0.126 
College or above 0.495 0.551 0.467 0.536 0.549 0.478 
CP membership 
(CP=1) 
0.185 0.180 0.203 0.112 0.173 0.189 
Seniority 81.537 61.933 94.994 50.750 60.445 88.580 
Position (manager 
and technician=1) 
0.308 0.303 0.307 0.324 0.302 0.310 
Firm 
Attributes 
Ownership: SOEs 0.090 0.056 0.113 0.035 0.058 0.100 
FOEs 0.164 0.256 0.140 0.119 0.244 0.137 
POEs 0.746 0.688 0.746 0.845 0.698 0.762 
Firm size: 50 
workers or below 
0.072 0.066 0.072 0.086 0.065 0.075 
50–199 workers 0.395 0.337 0.420 0.372 0.353 0.409 
200 workers or 
above 
0.533 0.597 0.508 0.542 0.582 0.517 
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History 144.426 143.646 148.997 123.818 143.262 144.814 
Region (subordinate 
counties=1) 
0.231 0.108 0.283 0.193 0.114 0.270 
Industry 
(manufacturing=1)  
0.552 0.556 0.569 0.464 0.554 0.551 
Skill intensity 0.151 0.204 0.137 0.127 0.202 0.134 
Sample size 2857 641 1846 370 709 2148 
Notes: No significant difference of wages occurs between Types N1 and N2 workers. Moreover, the 
sample size of Type N2 workers who are non-union members with non-elected union chairs is only 68.  
  
38 
 
Table 3: Average Hourly Wages and Wage Differences among Workers 
Worker type 
Sample 
size 
Average wage 
(yuan/hour) 
M vs. N 
M2 vs. 
M1 
M2 vs. 
N1 
(N2+M2) 
vs. 
(N1+M1) 
N: Non-union 
members 
370 14.916 
1.534*** 
(10.29%) 
1.389*** 
(8.63%) 
2.601*** 
(17.48%) 
1.328***                  
(8.34%) 
  N1: With non-
elected chairs 
302 14.881 
  N2: With elected 
chairs 
68 15.074 
M: Union members  2487 16.451 
M1: With non-
elected chairs 
1846 16.093 
M2: With 
elected chairs 
641 17.482 
Note: 1) percentage of the wage differences are in brackets; 2) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1. 
Sources: Author’s calculation from the Hangzhou Labor Relations Survey 2012.  
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Table 4: OLS Estimates on Workers’ Wage (Types N, M1, and M2) 
Variable/Model 
(1)          
Full 
(2) 
Excluding 
A2 
(3) 
Excluding 
SOEs  
(4) 
Excluding 
FOEs 
(5) 
Excluding  
Large Firms 
Union: Type M1 workers ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. 
Type N workers 0.002 −0.005 0.005 0.024 −0.102*** 
  (0.079) (−0.172) (0.168) (0.931) (−3.820) 
Type M2 workers 0.096*** 0.098*** 0.101*** 0.099*** 0.044* 
  (3.756) (3.835) (3.634) (4.886) (1.760) 
Age 0.043
***
 0.043
***
 0.044
***
 0.042
***
 0.036
***
 
  (4.858) (4.735) (4.587) (3.941) (4.345) 
Age
2
 −0.001
***
 −0.001
***
 −0.001
***
 −0.001
***
 −0.000
***
 
  (−4.571) (−4.462) (−4.353) (−3.717) (−4.308) 
Gender (female=1) −0.148
***
 −0.148
***
 −0.145
***
 −0.144
***
 −0.158
***
 
  (−5.357) (−5.198) (−5.004) (−4.602) (−6.361) 
Hukou (agriculture=1) −0.039 −0.042 −0.045
*
 −0.017 −0.002 
  (−1.584) (−1.718) (−1.854) (−0.699) (−0.118) 
Education: Junior school 
or below 
ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. 
High school 0.001 0.005 0.000 0.022 0.027 
  (0.047) (0.185) (−0.006) (0.704) (1.332) 
Vocational school 0.023 0.016 0.012 0.027 −0.024 
  (0.924) (0.613) (0.425) (0.849) (−0.778) 
College or above 0.127
***
 0.126
***
 0.119
***
 0.134
***
 0.119
***
 
  (4.698) (4.655) (5.097) (4.764) (3.287) 
CP membership (CP=1) 0.023 0.029 0.012 0.014 0.044
*
 
  (0.773) (1.018) (0.353) (0.388) (1.811) 
Seniority 0.001
*
 0.001
*
 0.001
**
 0.001
*
 0.001
***
 
  (1.880) (1.872) (2.745) (1.961) (3.121) 
Seniority
2
 0.000 0.000 −0.000
**
 0.000 −0.000
**
 
  (−1.711) (−1.691) (−2.801) (−1.742) (−2.886) 
Position (manager and 
technician=1) 
0.106
***
 0.104
***
 0.109
***
 0.086
***
 0.093
***
 
  (5.913) (6.166) (5.558) (4.456) (4.074) 
Ownership: SOEs ref. ref. -- ref. ref. 
FOEs 0.043 0.035 
ref. -- 
−0.026 
  (0.684) (0.543) (−0.438) 
POEs −0.062 −0.069
*
 −0.107
*
 −0.075
**
 −0.039 
  (−1.683) (−1.870) (−2.022) (−2.205) (−0.806) 
Firm size: 50 workers or 
below 
ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. 
50–199 workers 0.027 0.031 0.032 0.032 0.013 
  (0.684) (0.790) (0.761) (0.756) (0.297) 
200 workers or above 0.095
**
 0.094
**
 0.102
**
 0.074
**
 -- 
  (2.990) (2.897) (2.930) (2.310) -- 
History 0.000 −0.000
*
 −0.001 0.000 0.000 
 (−1.640) (−1.787) (−1.666) (−1.182) (−0.490) 
Region (subordinate 
counties and cities=1)  
−0.090
**
 −0.087
**
 −0.075 −0.089
**
 −0.049 
  (−2.268) (−2.212) (−1.751) (−2.821) (−0.880) 
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Industry 
(manufacturing=1) 
0.025 0.028 0.011 0.008 −0.009 
  (0.753) (0.840) (0.274) (0.255) (−0.169) 
Skill intensity 0.423
***
 0.411
***
 0.426
***
 0.404
***
 0.264
**
 
  (6.743) (5.872) (6.948) (5.511) (2.254) 
Constant 1.841
***
 1.845
***
 1.899
***
 1.886
***
 1.881
***
 
  (13.067) (12.500) (11.547) (10.772) (13.694) 
Sample size 2857 2789 2609 2457 2055 
Adjusted R
2
 0.270 0.269 0.279 0.222 0.191 
Note: 1) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1; 2) Two-tailed test and t-statistics are in parentheses; 3) 
Sampling weights are incorporated into the regression analysis in which the weights are estimated by 
the ratio of actual firm size to the sampled size.  
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Table 5: OLS Estimates on Workers’ Wage (Type N1+M1 and N2+M2) 
Variable/Model 
(1)            
Full 
(2)      
Excluding 
SOEs  
(3)      
Excluding 
FOEs 
(4)      
Excluding  
Large Firms 
Union: Type (N1+M1) workers ref. ref. ref. ref. 
Type (N2+M2)  workers 0.092
***
 0.101
***
 0.087
***
 0.047
*
 
  (4.027) (4.196) (3.951) (1.934) 
Ownership: SOEs ref. -- ref. ref. 
FOEs 0.045 
ref. -- 
-0.031 
  (0.711) (−0.521) 
POEs −0.062 −0.108
*
 −0.072
**
 −0.04 
  (−1.707) (−2.053) (−2.169) (−0.804) 
Firm size: 50 workers or below ref. ref. ref. ref. 
50–199 workers 0.025 0.03 0.03 0.016 
  (0.653) (0.724) (0.697) (0.384) 
200 workers or above 0.096
***
 0.102
**
 0.075
**
 -- 
  (3.019) (2.963) (2.275) -- 
Other control variables Y Y Y Y 
Constant 1.841
***
 1.896
***
 1.872
***
 1.961
***
 
  (12.671) (11.276) (10.742) (13.604) 
Sample size 2857 2609 2457 2055 
Adjusted R
2
 0.270 0.280 0.221 0.181 
Note: 1) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1; 2) Two-tailed test and t-statistics are in parentheses; 3) 
Sampling weights are incorporated into the regression analysis in which the weights are estimated by 
the ratio of actual firm size to the sampled size; 4) Other control variables are the same as those in 
Table 4.  
42 
 
Table 6: Bias-adjusted Effects of Direct Union Elections (Type M1 and M2) 
The Effects of 
Direct 
Elections  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Uncontrolled 
Effect 
Controlled 
Effect 
Identified 
Set 
Delta for 
Beta=0 
Identified 
Set 
Delta for 
Beta=0 
(Std.Error),  
[R
2
] 
(Std.Error),  
[R
2
] 
(Rmax= 
1.3R
2
, δ=1) 
(Rmax=1.
3R
2
) 
(Rmax= 0.59, 
δ=1) 
(Rmax= 
0.59) 
Full 
0.161**  
(0.055) 
[0.037] 
0.097*** 
(0.025) 
[0.274] 
[0.073, 
0.097] 
3.565 
[0.003, 
0.097] 
1.025 
Excluding 
SOEs 
0.175*** 
(0.056) 
[0.044] 
0.102*** 
(0.027) 
[0.283] 
[0.074, 
0.102] 
3.181 
[−0.003, 
0.102] 
0.972 
Excluding 
FOEs 
0.146**  
(0.046) 
[0.031] 
0.103*** 
(0.021) 
[0.223] 
[0.087, 
0.103] 
5.284 
[0.013, 
0.103] 
1.127 
Excluding 
large firms 
0.058*   
(0.030) 
[0.005] 
0.045*   
(0.025) 
[0.181] 
[0.040, 
0.045] 
8.080 
[0.005, 
0.045] 
1.118 
Note: 1) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1; 2) The treatment variable involves union members with 
directly elected chairs; 3) The regressions for uncontrolled effects only include the treatment variable 
while we control for all firm and worker attributes as OLS for evaluating the controlled effects; 4) The 
lower bounding value of the identified set is the coefficient from the regression with all controlled 
observables and the upper bounding value of the identified set is the bias-adjusted treatment effect 
with specific assumption on Rmax and δ; 5) Columns (3) and (5) list the identified sets for the 
controlled treatment effects where Column (3) takes Rmax = 1.3R
2 
and Column (5) takes Rmax = 0.59 for 
δ = 1; 6) Columns (4) and (6) report the value of δ, i.e., the relative degree of selection on observed 
and unobserved variables, when the treatment effects are set as zero and where Column (4) takes Rmax 
= 1.3R
2 
and Column (6) takes Rmax = 0.59; and 7) Sampling weights are incorporated into the 
regression analysis in which the weights are estimated by the ratio of actual firm size to the sampled 
size.   
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Table 7: Bias-adjusted Effects of Direct Union Elections (Type N1+M1 and N2+M2) 
The Effects of 
Direct 
Elections  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Uncontrolled 
Effect 
Controlled 
Effect 
Identified 
Set 
Delta for 
Beta=0 
Identified 
Set 
Delta for 
Beta=0 
(Std.Error),  
[R
2
] 
(Std.Error),  
[R
2
] 
(Rmax= 
1.3R
2
, δ=1) 
(Rmax=1.
3R
2
) 
(Rmax= 
0.59, δ=1) 
(Rmax= 
0.59) 
(1) Full 
0.156**  
(0.055) 
[0.033] 
0.092*** 
(0.023) 
[0.270] 
[0.070, 
0.092] 
3.715 
[0.003, 
0.092] 
1.032 
(2) Excluding 
SOEs 
0.170*** 
(0.056) 
[0.040] 
0.101*** 
(0.024) 
[0.280] 
[0.075, 
0.101] 
3.473 
[0.005, 
0.101] 
1.046 
(3) Excluding 
FOEs 
0.132**  
(0.047) 
[0.024] 
0.087*** 
(0.022) 
[0.221] 
[0.072, 
0.087] 
4.975 
[0.000, 
0.087] 
1.003 
(4) Excluding 
large firms 
0.062*   
(0.030) 
[0.005] 
0.046*   
(0.024) 
[0.181] 
[0.042, 
0.046] 
8.314 
[0.007, 
0.046] 
1.149 
Note: 1) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1; 2) The treatment variable involves union members with 
directly elected chairs; 3) The regressions for uncontrolled effects only include the treatment variable 
while we control for all firm and worker attributes as OLS for evaluating the controlled effects; 4) The 
lower bounding value of the identified set is the coefficient from the regression with all controlled 
observables and the upper bounding value of the identified set is the bias-adjusted treatment effect 
with specific assumption on Rmax and δ; 5) Columns (3) and (5) list the identified sets for the 
controlled treatment effects where Column (3) takes Rmax = 1.3R
2 
and Column (5) takes Rmax = 0.59 for 
δ = 1; 6) Columns (4) and (6) report the value of δ, i.e., the relative degree of selection on observed 
and unobserved variables, when the treatment effects are set as zero and where Column (4) takes Rmax 
= 1.3R
2 
and Column (6) takes Rmax = 0.59; and 7) Sampling weights are incorporated into the 
regression analysis in which the weights are estimated by the ratio of actual firm size to the sampled 
size.   
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Table 8: The Effects of Direct Union Elections by Local Linear Regression Matching 
Local Liner 
Regression 
Matching 
Treatment Group Control Group ATT 
Balance Test 
(Sample Size) (Sample Size) (t-value) 
(1) Full 
M2 
N=609 
M1 
N=1846 
0.059*** 
Balance 
(2.950) 
(2) Excluding SOEs 
M2 
N=574 
M1 
N=1651 
0.072*** 
Balance 
(4.235) 
(3) Excluding FOEs 
M2 
N=484 
M1 
N=1625 
0.053*** 
Balance 
(2.789) 
(4) Excluding Large  
Firms 
M2 
N=411 
M1 
N=1356 
0.015 
Balance 
(0.625) 
Note: 1) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1; 2) Two-tailed test and t-statistics are in parentheses with 
the bootstrap approach repeated 100 times; 3) The logit model in the first stage includes all variables 
as OLS; and 4) The lowest and highest 5% percentiles of P-values are excluded within the common 
support region of matching. 
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Table 9: Estimates on Workers’ Rights and Benefits (Type N, M1 and M2) 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Monthly 
Working 
Hours 
Free 
Checkups 
On-the-job 
Training 
Social 
Security 
Satisfaction 
Overall 
Satisfaction 
Union: Type M1 
worker 
ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. 
Type N worker 0.040
**
 −0.147** −0.175*** −0.159 −0.128 
  (2.339) (−2.396) (−3.710) (−0.733) (−0.977) 
Type M2 worker −0.016 −0.011 0.013 0.449
***
 0.226
***
 
  (−1.293) (−0.227) (0.262) (3.452) (3.205) 
Age −0.006
**
 0.020* 0.018* 0.004 0.003 
  (−2.183) (2.129) (2.019) (0.143) (0.236) 
Age
2
 0.000
*
 −0.000** −0.000** 0.000 0.000 
  (2.131) (−2.553) (−2.581) (0.175) (0.155) 
Gender (female=1) −0.002 −0.027 −0.068** −0.018 0.001 
  (−0.407) (−1.457) (−2.335) (−0.424) (0.015) 
Hukou 
(agriculture=1) 
0.023
**
 −0.009 0.008 0.169
***
 0.099
***
 
  (2.262) (−0.209) (0.225) (3.730) (4.364) 
Education: Junior 
school or below 
ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. 
High school −0.014
**
 −0.054 0.113*** −0.137
**
 −0.062 
  (−2.803) (−1.050) (3.297) (−2.540) (−1.583) 
Vocational school −0.007 −0.077 0.035 −0.063 −0.054 
  (−0.629) (−1.495) (0.783) (−0.700) (−1.381) 
College or above −0.022 −0.067 0.039 0.006 −0.001 
  (−1.269) (−1.061) (0.778) (0.091) (−0.017) 
CP membership 
(CP=1) 
−0.011 0.021 0.042 0.071 0.043 
  (−1.472) (0.531) (1.440) (0.609) (0.771) 
Seniority 0.000 0.003*** 0.002*** −0.001 −0.001 
  (1.221) (4.411) (3.161) (−0.425) (−0.713) 
Seniority
2
 −0.000
*
 −0.000*** −0.000*** 0.000 0.000 
  (−1.773) (−3.373) (−3.286) (−0.662) (−0.887) 
Position (manager 
and technician=1) 
0.008 −0.041 0.032 −0.043 −0.020 
  (0.740) (−1.024) (1.252) (−0.579) (−0.603) 
Ownership: SOEs ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. 
FOEs 0.044
*
 0.200*** 0.110 −0.087 −0.047 
  (1.978) (3.284) (1.235) (−0.566) (−0.690) 
POEs 0.018 0.062 0.099 −0.026 −0.004 
  (1.309) (0.783) (1.246) (−0.169) (−0.058) 
Firm size: 50 workers 
or below 
ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. 
50–199 workers 0.001 −0.005 0.062 −0.058 −0.058 
  (0.196) (−0.160) (1.252) (−0.737) (−1.523) 
200 workers or 
above 
−0.003 0.053 0.053 −0.154 −0.114 
  (−0.208) (1.026) (1.163) (−1.149) (−1.594) 
History 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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 (0.795) (0.979) (−0.445) (0.470) (0.633) 
Region (subordinate 
counties and cities=1)  
0.050
*
 0.051 0.071 −0.134 −0.110 
  (2.015) (0.550) (0.870) (−0.763) (−1.059) 
Industry 
(manufacturing=1) 
0.030 −0.086 0.004 −0.062 −0.053 
  (1.631) (−1.400) (0.119) (−0.399) (−0.543) 
Skill intensity −0.010 0.427*** 0.091 −0.068 −0.015 
  (−0.364) (3.814) (0.978) (−0.169) (−0.063) 
Constant 5.300
***
 
   
4.127
***
 
  (124.221) 
   
(12.964) 
cut1 _cons  
 
  −2.790
***
 
 
  
 
  (−4.621) 
 
cut2_cons 
 
  −2.299
***
 
 
  
 
  (−3.699) 
 
cut3_cons 
 
  −0.848 
 
  
 
  (−1.358) 
 
cut4_cons 
 
  0.333 
 
    (0.512)  
Number of obs. 2881 2881 2881 2875 2846 
Adjusted R
2
 0.153 -- -- -- 0.072 
Note: 1) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1; 2) Two-tailed test and t-statistics are in parentheses; 3) 
Sampling weights are incorporated into the regression analysis in which the weights are estimated by 
the ratio of actual firm size to the sampled size; 4) Columns (1) and (5) are OLS regression results and 
Columns (2) to (4) are logit regression results. As we adjusted the sampling weights, Stata does not 
report the log likelihood or pseudo adjusted R-squared for logit regressions.  
 
  
47 
 
Table 10: Estimates on Workers’ Rights and Benefits (Type N1+M1 and N2+M2) 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Monthly 
Working 
Hours 
Free 
Checkups 
On-the-job 
Training 
Social 
Security 
Satisfaction 
Overall 
Satisfaction 
Union: Type N1+M1 
worker 
ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. 
Type N2+M2 
worker 
−0.016 0.001 0.033 0.463
***
 0.241
***
 
(−1.469) (0.033) (0.722) (3.754) (3.604) 
Other Controls Y Y Y Y Y 
Number of obs. 2881 2881 2881 2875 2846 
Adjusted R
2
 0.138  -- --  -- 0.067 
Note: 1) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1; 2) Two-tailed test and t-statistics are in parentheses; 3) 
Sampling weights are incorporated into the regression analysis in which the weights are estimated by 
the ratio of actual firm size to the sampled size; 4) Columns (1) and (5) are OLS regression results and 
Columns (2) to (4) are logit regression results. As we adjusted the sampling weights, Stata does not 
report the log likelihood or pseudo adjusted R-squared for logit regressions; and 5) Other control 
variables are the same as those in Table 9. 
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Table 11: Comparison between Directly Elected and Non-directly Elected Firms 
Item Variables 
Directly elected Non-directly elected 
Difference 
Obs. Mean S.D. Obs. Mean S.D. 
Firm 
Performance 
Per capita output  (10,000 
yuan per worker) 
39 30.39 47.88 136 16.63 26.48 13.76** 
Per capita sale (10,000 
yuan per worker) 
77 137.40 234.80 262 114.30 307.70 23.10 
Firm 
Governance 
in Labor 
Relations 
Proven by pay slip 
(yes=1) 
89 0.91 0.29 297 0.86 0.35 0.05 
With aid system (yes=1) 89 0.84 0.37 297 0.81 0.39 0.03 
Holds workers’ congress 
(yes=1) 
89 0.92 0.27 297 0.89 0.32 0.03 
Publicizes firm affairs 
(yes=1) 
89 0.96 0.21 297 0.87 0.34 0.09** 
Settles labor disputes 
(yes=1) 
89 0.98 0.15 297 0.91 0.28 0.07** 
With collective 
negotiations of wages 
(yes=1) 
89 0.83 0.04 297 0.79 0.02 0.04 
Number of negotiations 71 0.86 0.44 208 0.86 0.55 0.00 
Individual 
Attributes of 
Union 
Chairs 
Age 88 44.68 9.37 277 44.57 9.57 0.11 
Gender (female=1) 89 0.30 0.46 297 0.38 0.49 -0.08 
Education (colleague and 
above=1) 
89 0.49 0.50 297 0.39 0.49 0.10* 
Full-time (yes =1) 89 0.33 0.47 297 0.24 0.43 0.09* 
With local Hukou (yes=1) 89 0.79 0.41 297 0.83 0.38 -0.04 
Note: 1) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1; 2) Two-tailed test and t-statistics are in parentheses; and 
3) The number of observations vary because of missing values of available variables.  
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Appendix Figure A1: Grassroots Trade unions and Union Membership in China 
Sources: Data are from the China Statistical Yearbook 2016 and are collected by the National Bureau 
of Statistics.  
Note: The statistical caliber of the number of grassroots unions changed in 2003. For consistency, we 
only record the subsequent numbers.  
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Appendix Figure A2: Union Density in China 
Sources: Data are from the China Statistical Yearbook 2016 and are collected by the National Bureau 
of Statistics.  
Note: 1) The union density rates were calculated by the authors. All the nominators are numbers of 
labor union members. Curve A sets the denominator as the number of workers in unionized firms. 
Curve B sets the denominator as the number of workers in urban area. Aside from urban employment, 
additional employment in private firms and self-employed business in the rural area are included as 
the denominator in Curve C; 2) The statistical caliber of the number of grassroots trade unions 
changed in 2003. For consistency, we only record the subsequent numbers. 
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Appendix Figure A3: Balance Test of PSM Estimations (Treated B2 vs. Untreated B1) 
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Appendix Table B1: Comparison between Unionized and Non-unionized Firms 
Variables Unionized Firm Non-unionized Firm 
Difference 
Obs. Mean S.D. Obs. Mean S.D. 
Ownership: SOEs 386 0.080 0.272 118 0.025 0.158 0.05** 
FOEs 386 0.122 0.327 118 0.059 0.237 0.06* 
POEs 386 0.785 0.411 118 0.873 0.335 −0.09** 
Region (subordinate 
counties and cities=1) 
386 0.249 0.433 118 0.203 0.404 0.05 
Firm size: 50 workers 
or below 
386 0.360 0.481 118 0.771 0.422 −0.41*** 
50–199 workers 386 0.466 0.500 118 0.195 0.398 0.27*** 
200 workers or 
above 
386 0.174 0.379 118 0.034 0.182 0.14*** 
Industry 
(manufacturing=1) 
386 0.585 0.493 118 0.407 0.493 0.18*** 
Skill intensity 385 0.151 0.199 117 0.146 0.214 0.01 
Firm age (months) 372 134.0 76.49 113 99.45 58.61 34.5*** 
Share of male workers 383 0.560 0.203 115 0.523 0.208 0.04* 
Per capita profits 2011 349 3.978 19.050 92 1.905 8.526 2.07 
Per capita capital 2011 227 14.11 23.29 35 18.61 34.34 −4.5 
Per capita output 2011 214 71.98 89.76 27 61.71 80.57 10.27 
Per capita sales 2011 340 119.7 292.2 90 76.17 220.3 43.53 
Firms provide pay slips 386 0.127 0.333 118 0.102 0.304 0.03 
Firms establish aid 
systems 
386 0.816 0.388 118 0.585 0.495 0.23*** 
Firms set up workers’ 
congress  
386 0.896 0.305 118 0.517 0.502 0.38*** 
Firms publicize firm 
affairs 
386 0.886 0.318 118 0.788 0.410 0.10*** 
Firms settle labor 
disputes 
386 0.927 0.260 118 0.712 0.455 0.22*** 
Note: 1) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1; and 2) Two-tailed test and t-statistics are in parentheses. 
 
